Abstract. Online publishers sell opportunities to show ads. Some advertisers pay only if their ad elicits a user response. Publishers estimate response rates for ads in order to estimate expected revenues from showing the ads. Then publishers select ads that maximize estimated expected revenue.
Introduction
Online publishers use auctions to sell opportunities to advertise, called ad calls, to online advertisers. There are two broad categories of online advertising auctions: search and display. In search advertising auctions the advertiser pays only if their ad elicits a click. In display advertising auctions, advertisers may select a basis for payment. Some advertisers pay when the ad is shown, others pay only when showing the ad elicits a user response such as a click or a purchase. (For details on auctions for online advertising, refer to Varian [44, 43] , Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz [17] , and Lahie and Pennock [29] .) When advertisers pay per click or other user response, the revenue received by the publisher for showing an ad is random. Since user response rates are not known exactly but must be estimated, there is uncertainty in addition to randomness. The estimation accuracy of response rates varies.
One reason is that the amount of historical data varies. Another reason is that the response rates themselves vary, and more data is required to estimate smaller rates with the same relative accuracy.
With randomness, a risk-neutral seller seeks to maximize expected revenue. Facing uncertainty, the seller may select an offer having maximum estimated expected revenue. However, this is not necessarily the best policy for maximizing actual expected revenue.
The reason is that selecting a maximum estimate selects for a combination of having an over-estimate and having a large actual expected revenue. Some classes of ads are more likely to have inaccurate estimates, such as ads with lower response rates and ads for which there is less historical data. Even if the individual ad estimates are unbiased, these classes are more likely to have the largest ad over-estimates. So selecting a maximum estimate can favor these classes even if they offer less expected revenue than other classes.
Having more buyers in the auction exacerbates the problem, because more estimates means more and more extreme over-estimates. However, having many buyers is not sufficient for selecting a maximum estimate to be a sub-optimal policy for maximizing expected revenue. Varying levels of uncertainty about revenue distributions is also required. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. Section 3 presents some theory on selection bias for estimated offer values. Section 4 explores correcting selection bias for online display advertising auctions. Section 5 focuses on corrections for search advertising auctions. Section 6 discusses opportunities for future work.
Related Work
There are few areas of work related to this paper. One is work by Athey and Levin [2] on U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. In that work, as in this paper, the seller selects an offer (ex ante) based on estimated values but is paid (ex post) based on actual values. The forest service work focuses on how buyers can use private information to exploit the seller's estimation and selection process.
Another area of related work, by Wilson [47] and Thaler [39] , concerns the winner's curse. The winner's curse occurs when multiple bidders estimate the value of an item and submit bids based on those estimates. The auction, by selecting the highest bid, tends to select a bid based on an overestimate of value. As a result, the winner tends to realize less value than their bid. Both the winner's curse and the revenue loss studied in this paper are the result of the difference between actual values and first order statistics of estimates of values. (For more on order statistics, refer to David and Nagaraja [14] .) The revenue loss studied in this paper is borne by the seller or market-maker, because the seller or market-maker must estimate the values of bids and bears the exposure from misestimation. When the bidders, rather than the market-maker, bear the risk, Wilson [47] gives a method to correct for bias.
Another area of related work is machine learning, where uniform error bounds are used extensively to predict whether a model selected on the basis of limited training data is likely to fit as-yet-unseen data drawn from the same distribution. As limited training data is used to estimate the test performance of more models, it becomes less likely that a model that maximizes estimated expected performance will perform nearly as well as its estimate on test data. (For background on machine learning, see Duda and Hart [16] , Valiant [40] , and Devroye, Györfi, and Lugosi [15] . Work on uniform error bounds includes Vapnik [42] , Audibert, Munos, and Szepesvari [3] , Langford [30] , and Bax [5] .) This effect is similar to the gap between a maximum estimated expected revenue ad and the actual expected revenue from that ad. Both are manifestations of regression to the mean, studied by Galton [18] and Samuels [36] .
The nested classes of classifiers used in support vector machines and other kernel classifiers are similar to classes of ads with different estimation accuracies in this paper. Kernel methods favor classifiers from classes with more certain bounds on test data performance, even if their estimated expected performance is slightly inferior to classifiers from classes with more uncertainty. For more on support vector machines, refer to Vapnik [41] . For other kernel methods, refer to Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini [37] .
In statistics, Hsu and Chen [23] , Wilcox [45] , and Bechhofer and Turnbull [6] study procedures to select populations with maximum means among sets of populations. In this paper, offers play the role of populations and awarding an ad call to an offer plays the role of a sample. Their work focuses on determining the number of samples needed to confidently select a population with maximum mean, while this paper focuses on selecting an offer before any further sampling.
Theory of Selection Bias for Estimated Offers
This section shows that favoring offers that have more accurately estimated offer values improves revenue, under the following model. Actual offer values µ 1 , . . . , µ n are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution. The auctioneer does not know these actual values. Instead, the auctioneer receives unbiased estimates X 1 , . . . , X n of the offer values. The estimation errors are normal, and the auctioneer knows their standard deviations. The following theorem shows that selecting an offer based on a combination of estimated value and accuracy of estimation increases expected actual value of the selected offer. σ 1 ) , . . . , X n ∼ N (µ n , σ n ) be normal random variables with actual offer values µ 1 , . . . , µ n as means and known standard deviations σ 1 , . . . , σ n . Let
Assume n ≥ 3 and σ 1 , . . . , σ n are not all equal. Then
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. σ 1 < σ 2 . Define X * = max(X 1 , . . . , X n ). We will show that when X 1 and X 2 are approximately tied for X * , µ 1 > µ 2 is more likely than µ 1 < µ 2 . Let a and b be any values in the support of the distribution of µ i with a > b. Since µ 1 , . . . , µ n are i.i.d., (µ 1 , µ 2 ) = (a, b) and (µ 1 , µ 2 ) = (b, a) are equally likely. So we only need to show:
Let m 3 = max(X 3 , . . . , X n ). Integrate over values x for X * to find the difference:
Similarly, define
The midpoint h = a+b 2 is an equal number of standard deviations from the mean of X 1 whether µ 1 = a or µ 1 = b. The same holds for X 2 . So
Using this notation, the difference integral is
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, so the first bracketed term is positive. (A proof is in Appendix A.) For n ≥ 3, the second bracketed term is positive. So µ 1 > µ 2 is more likely than µ 1 < µ 2 . Integrating over all pairs of values (a, b) with a > b in the support of the distribution of µ and summing over all pairs of offers with unequal estimation error standard deviations yields the theorem.
In addition to increasing revenue, the proof shows that some correction for estimation accuracy improves the probability of selecting an offer with maximum actual value. We call this probability selectivity.
Selection Bias in Display Advertising
This section focuses on selection bias in display advertising, which is the portion of online advertising with graphical ads rather than text-only ads.
(The next section focuses on text only ads, which includes most search engine advertising.) Subsection 4.1 discusses the role of estimated offer values in display advertising. Subsection 4.2 explores how estimated offer values impact revenue and selectivity. Subsection 4.3 uses simulated auctions to evaluate a correction for selection bias.
Display Advertising and Estimated Offer Values.
Marketplaces for display advertising such as the RightMedia Exchange host auctions where publishers sell ad calls -opportunities to advertise -and advertisers buy them. Advertisers have a choice of price types, including cost-per-impression (CPM), cost-per-click (CPC), and cost-per-action or cost-per-acquisition (CPA). CPM offers pay when their ad is displayed. (The abbreviation CPM represents cost per mille, or thousand impressions; in this paper we treat CPM prices as per-impression prices.) CPC and CPA offers pay only if displaying the ad elicits a user response. For CPC offers, the response is a user clicking on the ad. For CPA offers, the advertiser specifies the response; examples include a user completing an online purchase, filling out a form, or visiting a web page.
An auctioneer can use expected offer values to compare offers with different price types. Let p * be the response rate for each ad -the probability that displaying the ad will elicit the user response required for the advertiser to pay. For CPM offers, p * = 1.0. For CPC offers, p * is the click-through rate. For CP A offers, p * is the probability that the user will complete the action specified by the advertiser. Let b be the bid amount, the amount an advertiser pays for responses. Then the expected offer value is bp * . The auctioneer's goal is to select an offer with maximum bp * .
Since response rates p * are unknown for CPC and CPA offers, the auctioneer uses estimated response rates p. There are many methods to estimate probabilities of clicks and conversions. The simplest method is Bernoulli sampling, where the fraction of auction wins that result in a click or conversion is the estimated probability. Generally, methods begin with a prior based on results for similar ads and content. Then, Bernoulli sampling is used to modify the estimated probability. In essence, most methods try to "partially borrow" samples from other ads and content, for which there is plenty of data, and then tune the estimate based on actual performance of the ad on the same or similar content. As samples accumulate, the estimated probability is based more and more on Bernoulli sampling. The following analysis focuses on Bernoulli sampling, but the general principles also apply to more complex prediction methods.
Let p * be the actual probability of action for a performance ad. Let p be the estimate of probability based on Bernoulli sampling. The estimate p has a binomial distribution, with mean p * . If the ad is shown n times, resulting in k actions, then
The estimate p is unbiased:
The variance is
The standard deviation is
For click prediction, p * is on the order of 0.01. For conversion prediction, it can be on the order of 0.001. In both cases, the square root of 1 − p * is very close to one. So
Now consider how the estimation error in response rates affects estimation error in expected offer values. There is no bias:
However, based on the approximation
Consider this as a fraction of the actual expected offer value:
So the relative error due to estimation grows as p * shrinks. As a result, CPA ads are likely to have much less accurate estimates than CPC ads. For example, with n = 10, 000 samples and p * = 0.001 for a CPA ad, the estimated expected offer value is expected to differ from the actual by about 33%. In contrast, for a CPC ad with p * = 0.01 and the same number of samples, the expected relative error is only about 10%. (For a CPM ad the relative error is 0%, since the probability of payout is known with certainty.)
The gap in accuracy between CPA and CPC ads can be even worse in practice than in these examples. Conversions for one ad may be based on different actions than conversions on other ads. So using conversions from one ad to estimate conversion probabilities for other ads is usually less effective than doing so for click probabilities.
Another way to view the formula above is that to keep relative error constant, if the probability of action p * shrinks by some factor, then the number of auctions needed to learn p * must grow by the same factor. For our examples with p * = 0.01 for CPC ads and p * = 0.001 for CPA ads, ten times as many learning auctions must be devoted to each CPA ad as to each CPC ad in order to have the same expected relative error for both.
4.2.
How Selection Bias Impacts Display Auction Outcomes. The auction selects a winner by maximizing the estimated expected offer value. Ideally, the auction would select an offer that maximizes actual expected value. This subsection uses simulations to examine the impact of using expected rather than actual values.
We examine impact in terms of revenue and in terms of whether the auction selects an offer with maximum actual value in spite of using estimated values. Let ideal expected revenue r * be the revenue obtained by an auction based on actual values, and let expected revenue r be the revenue obtained based on estimates. Define revenue impact R to be the portion of ideal expected revenue foregone by using estimates: R = r * − r r * . Define selectivity to be the probability that an auction based on estimates selects an offer with maximum actual expected value.
We will use second-price auctions for our simulations. These auctions are common in online advertising (see Varian [44, 43] and Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz [17] ,) though they are not necessarily revenue-optimizing (see Lahie and Pennock [29] and Myerson [34] .) For general information on auction mechanisms, refer to Milgrom [32] or Krishna [28] .
For the auctions, let
where i indexes offers, with bids b i and estimated response rates p i . Offer w wins the auction. (In case of a tie, select w uniformly at random from indices of tied expected payouts.) Let
Call offer s the second-place offer. The charge for the winning offer is
where ε is the minimum bid increment, usually $0.01. If offer w is a CPM offer, then the advertiser is charged a w . For a CPC offer, the advertiser is charged a w if the ad is clicked. For a CPA offer, the advertised is charge a w if showing the ad elicits the specified response.
Let p * w be the actual response rate for which p w is an estimate. Then the expected revenue from the auction is r = a w p * w . In our analysis, we will ignore the added ε in a w . Then
So expected revenue is r = p s b s p w p * w . To compute ideal expected revenue r * , the expected revenue if the auction could select winning and second-place offers based on actual response rates rather than estimates, define the ideal winning index 
Since the actual response rates are unknown, it is not possible to observe ideal revenue in real auctions. However, since responses are observed for auction winners, it is possible to measure the average difference between estimated and observed response rates for winners. This difference between p w and p * w , scaled by a w , is the difference between estimated expected revenue when a winner is selected and actual revenue received. In the RightMedia exchange, if there were no corrections, the difference for CPA winners would be about 20%. The difference for CPC winners would be less than 10%.
Correcting for Selection Bias.
In this subsection, we use simulations to examine how much we can improve revenue and selectivity by adjusting estimated offer values for selection bias. We estimate the standard deviation
by using the estimate p in place of (the unknown) p * . The adjusted probability estimate isp
We experiment with a variety of values for the coefficient c. In practice, the coefficient c can selected through empirical observations and experiments to optimize some combination of revenue and selectivity. Figures 1 and 2 show how the number of offers in each auction affects revenue and selectivity with adjustments based on standard deviations. Both figures are based on the same simulations. For each number of offers in 4, 8, . . . , 40, a different set of one million simulated auctions is generated and used for all values of c. For each auction, the specified number of offers are generated independently at random. For each offer, whether it is CPM, CPC, or CPA is determined uniformly at random. For CPM offers, p * = 1.0. For CPC offers, p * is drawn uniformly at random from {0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05}. For CPA offers, p * is drawn uniformly at random from {0.0002, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.002}. For all offer types, the number n of simulated learning auctions is drawn uniformly at random from {5000, 10, 000, 50, 000, 100, 000}. Then the estimated probability of action p is determined by drawing from a binomial distribution based on p * and n. Actual values are drawn at random from a normal distribution with mean $1.00 and standard deviation $0.10, and bids are set by dividing actual values by probabilities of action p * .
Revenue impact is the fraction of ideal revenue lost due to using estimated probabilities: R = r * −r r * , where r * is the ideal expected revenue andr is the expected revenue when usingp to estimate response rates. Selectivity is measured as the fraction of auctions won by the offer with highest actual value. From Figures 1 and  2 , note:
• As auction size grows the optimal adjustment coefficients c increase.
• The increase in optimal adjustment coefficients diminishes as auction size grows.
• Revenue impact and selectivity change smoothly with changes in the adjustment coefficient.
Selection Bias in Search Advertising
This section focuses on text advertising, the type of online advertising most commonly associated with search engines. Subsection 5.1 describes the slot auctions used for text advertising. Subsection 5.2 uses simulations to examine the impact of adjusting these auctions for selection bias.
5.1. The Search Advertising Auction. In the search advertising auctions, there are multiple slots for ads on each page and hence multiple auction winners. The auction orders offers by estimated expected offer value (breaking ties randomly.) The most desirable slot is awarded to the first offer, the second most desirable slot is awarded to the second offer, and so on. The charge for each winning offer is based on the estimated expected offer value of the next offer, with the intention of charging the first winner the second price, the second winner the third price, and so on. Typically, search auctions have only CPC pricing.
We will use notation similar to that for display auctions. As in display auctions, for offer i, let b i be the bid, p i be the estimated probability of action, and p * i be the actual probability of action. Also, the estimated expected offer value is b i p i and the actual expected offer value is b i p * i . We will use a generalized second-price auction model (Edelman et. al. 2007 , Varian 2009 .) Let m be the number of offers, and let k be the number of ad slots. For j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let w j be the original index i ∈ {1, . . . , m} of the offer in position j after ordering offers by estimated expected offer value. For example, w 1 is the index of the winner of the first ad slot. Similarly, let w * j be the original index i of the offer in position j after ordering offers by actual expected offer value. Then expected revenue is
Similarly, ideal revenue is
As in display, define the revenue impact for search as R = r * − r r * . In practice, response rates decrease as an ad moves from more to less desirable slots. (See Varian [43] , Blumrosen, Hartline, and Nong [8] , Kempe and Mahdian [27] , and Gomes, Immorlica, and Markakis [21] for more detail.) For simplicity, we ignore this effect in our simulations. Including this effect would increase the revenue impact from the early ad slots and decrease the impact from the later slots. When the effect is strong, the revenue from the top slot overwhelms the revenue from other slots, resembling the single-slot display auction. When the effect is weak, the effects on revenue resemble those in this section.
Adjusting Estimated Probabilities.
This subsection explores a method to increase revenue by adjusting estimated probabilities in search auctions. The method uses different adjustment coefficients c for different ad slots, because top ad slots have more competing offers than subsequent slots. In each case, each adjusted estimatep iŝ
Let c = (c 1 , . . . , c k ) be the sequence of c-values for ad slots. Then the auction procedure is as follows. Start with slot 1. Adjust probabilities of action for all offers using c 1 . Order by adjusted estimated expected offer values to determine a winner for the first slot and a charge based on the second offer in the ordering. Remove the winner. Then repeat this process, using c 2 for the second slot, c 3 for the third slot, and so on. Definer d to be the expected revenue using this procedure. Definê R d = r * −r d r * to be the revenue impact. Table 1 shows results of simulations to determine the revenue impact. Each column is based on a set of 10,000 simulated five-slot auctions. Each offer is generated independently, with:
• actual value determined at random from a normal distribution with mean $1 and standard deviation $0.10.
• p * selected uniformly at random from {0.005, 0.01, 0.015, . . . 0.05}.
• p drawn at random based on a binomial distribution simulating n learning auctions, with n selected uniformly at random from {1000, . . . , 10, 000}
For each column, an optimal value of c, called c * , is computed using gradient descent over a different set of auctions than those used for the results shown in Table 1 . • With six offers and five slots, the optimal adjustments for the top slots decrease probabilities to compensate for over-estimates, and the optimal adjustments for the remaining slots increase probabilities to compensate for under-estimates.
• For each number of offers, the optimal adjustments are largest for the top slots. Hence, adjustments increase as bias increases for each successive slot. (The bias for the winner is greater than the bias for the runner up, and so on.) • Slot-by-slot, optimal adjustments increase with number of offers, as expected.
• Observe the bottom row. For ten and more offers, the value of using the adjustment increases with the number of offers. For six offers, the value is higher than for ten and twenty offers, because the procedure makes an effective adjustment for the strong negative bias found in later ad slots.
Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of using estimates of offer values in an auction. We have shown that using estimates introduces a bias that can significantly reduce revenue and selectivity. This paper also outlines a few methods to correct for the bias, improving revenue and selectivity. The methods adjust estimated values of offers to be used in auctions. The adjustments are based on number of offers in each auction and the amount of learning for each offer. The general technique is to correct for the bias by adjusting estimated offer values based on the number of competitive offers in each auction and based on information about the distributions of actual values for each of the estimated values.
The methods in this paper have free parameters. To apply the methods in practice, it is possible to use simulations to select starting points for the parameters. Then use statistical optimization techniques, as in Box, Hunter, and Hunter [10] to adjust the parameters, optimizing for any desired combination of revenue and selectivity. Fortunately, the simulations in this paper indicate that revenue-optimal parameter settings are similar to selectivity-optimal ones.
For the parameter c in the methods that adjust based on standard deviation, our simulations showed that optimal values of c depend on the number of offers in each auction. This is similar to classical shrinkage methods such as James-Stein estimation [24, 38] . Most shrinkage methods are designed to minimize average error over the quantities being estimated; see for example Brown [11] and Bock [9] . For auctions that select a single winner, it would be interesting to explore whether there are estimators that tend to select the offer with highest actual mean directly, rather than first applying shrinkage methods and then selecting the maximum estimate.
In practice, many auctions contain some offers that are not competitive. Those offers should be removed before applying corrections or shrinkage. Uncompetitive offers can be identified using uniform error bound methods from machine learning, such as Hoeffding [22] bounds or Audibert et. al.'s empirical Bernstein [3, 33] bounds. Offers with upper bounds on value less than the maximum offer value lower bound can be declared uncompetitive and removed.
When the response probability estimates are based on sampling, it would be interesting to explore whether the methods in this paper could be improved by using more sophisticated methods to estimate confidence intervals for binomial proportions than the technique based on sample standard deviation used in this paper, which is called the normal approximation interval. Some alternative methods are the Wilson score interval [46] and the Clopper-Pearson interval [13] . There are several papers that compare different methods, such as Agresti and Coull [1] , Brown, Cai, and DasGupta [12] , and Ross [35] . In general, it is possible to use any of a variety of machine learning approaches to determine functional forms for the adjustments and set parameters for those forms. Inputs can include the number of offers, their estimated values, and any available information about the distributions of actual values, such as how much frequencies of action have varied over time for each offer or for sets of offers. Since online advertising marketplaces hold many auctions, the amount of data needed for machine learning approaches is available to them. One such approach is to use Bayesian principles, basing adjustments on priors developed using empirical data from past auctions. For details on Bayesian methods, refer to Berger [7] , Duda and Hart [16] , and Gelman [19] .
The simulations for search advertising auctions indicate that using different correction factors for different ad slots can improve revenue and selectivity. It would be interesting to explore whether a similar tactic can improve methods to correct for uncertainty in portfolio allocations for financial markets, as discussed in Jorion [26] , Jobson, Korkie, and Ratti [25] , and Lintner [31] . For example, it may be useful to apply one correction to all available investments, select one or a few investments to receive a portion of the resource allocation, remove those investments, apply a weaker correction to those remaining, and then select among them to receive the remaining resource allocation.
In the future, it would be interesting to examine interactions between correcting for selection bias and bidding strategy. For example, bidders may respond to corrections by choosing to submit firmer bids, such as using CPM pricing instead of CPC or CPA. In this case, though, bidders shift some risk from sellers to themselves, and they also incur the computational burden of estimating response probabilities. Alternatively, bidders may offer more than their actual values initially to win auctions, generate responses, and reduce uncertainty about their offer values. Then the bidders may reduce their bids, using selection bias corrections as a barrier for competition.
Another direction for future work is to explore interactions between learning, correcting for selection bias, and maximizing revenue over time. Multiarmed bandit literature, including Gittins [20] , Auer et. al. [4] , and Audibert [3] , examines strategies to optimize revenue over time by awarding some auctions to offers with uncertain values now to reduce uncertainty about their values in the future. In general, corrections for selection bias may discourage learning by awarding more auctions to offers with more certain values. So it may be useful to select auction winners based on a combination of selection bias correction with the value of learning. N (10, 1) and N (7, 2) . (These two distributions are shown for reference.) The other line is the pdf for a tie after swapping standard deviations -a tie between N (10, 2) and N (7, 1). That pdf is a reflection of the first, around the midpoint, 8.5. Each tie pdf peaks closer to the mean of the normal with the lower standard deviation. So higher-valued ties are more likely when the higher mean has the lower standard deviation. 
